


# Reimplement? Reuse? Both!

## Trustworthy Systems with Genode and SPARK

Alexander Senier  
Sound Static Analysis for Security Workshop  
Gaithersburg, MD, June 27<sup>th</sup>, 2018

# About Componolit

- **Security company** based in Dresden, Germany
- Enable customers to build secure & robust systems
  - Component-based systems
  - Program verification
- **Focus:**
  - Mobile devices
  - Industrial IoT



# What is SPARK?

## Language and toolset

- Programming language and tool set
- Different levels of assurance
- Adapt at your discretion

# What is SPARK?

## Stone level

- No side-effects in functions
- No parameter aliasing
- No pointers
- Fewer dangerous constructs



# What is SPARK?

## Higher assurance

- **Bronze level:** Correct initialization and data flow
- **Silver level:** Absence of runtime errors
- **Gold level:** Proof key (integrity) properties
- **Platinum level:** Functional correctness

What is SPARK?


You may know this: Jet engines





What is SPARK?

And this: Vermont Lunar CubeSat



# What is SPARK? And this: Tokeneer





# What is SPARK?

## And this: Muen Separation Kernel



What is SPARK?  
But how about this?

# SPARK for the Web!





# Demo #1

## Plain Web application



# Web application Security

- No authentication – bad idea!
- Options
  - Passwords
  - Client certificates
  - Authentication tokens

```
{
  "alg": "HS256",
  "typ": "JWT"
}


{
  "sub": "1234567890",
  "name": "John Doe",
  "iat": 1516239022
}
```





# Token-based authentication

## The monolithic approach



- A lot to trust!
- How likely is **no** critical bug within decades?
- Millions of lines of code
- Formally verifying all those components? Good luck!


**We still want trustworthy authentication for our wind turbine!  
Alternatives?**

# Interlude

## The Genode OS Framework\*

- **Recursive system structure**
  - Root: Microkernel
  - Parent: Responsibility + control
  - Isolation is default
  - Strict communication policy
- **Everything is a user-process**
  - Application
  - File systems
  - Drivers, Network stacks

### ■ Hierarchical System Architecture



# Interlude

## Minimal Trusted Computing Base

### ■ Trusted Computing Base (TCB)


- Software required for security
- Parents in tree
- Services used

### ■ TCB reduction

- Application-specific
- Example: File system

### ■ Sessions

### ■ Per-application TCB




# Architecture for Trustworthy Systems

## Strategy #1: Policy Objects

- Can't reimplement everything
- **Solution: software reuse**
  - Untrusted software (gray)
  - Policy object (green)
  - Client software (orange)
- **Policy object**
  - Establishes assumptions of client
  - Sanitizes
  - Enforces additional policies

### ■ Policy objects






# Architecture for Trustworthy Systems

## Strategy #2: Trusted Wrappers

- **Untrusted software (gray)**
  - E.g. disk, file system, cloud
- **Trusted wrapper**
  - Mandatory encryption
- **Client software (orange)**
  - No direct interaction with untrusted components
  - Minimal attack surface

### ■ Trusted wrapper



# Architecture for Trustworthy Systems

## Strategy #3: Transient components


### ■ Untrusted software

- E.g. Media decoder
- No chance to get this right!

### ■ Transient component

- Temporarily instantiate untrusted software for single file/stream
- Expose only simple interfaces (e.g. PCM audio)
- Cleanup on completion


### ■ Transient component



**Let's put it together.**


# Token-based authentication

## First component-based attempt



# Token-based authentication

## Second component-based attempt





# Demo #2

## Minimal JWT Validator



# Component-based architecture

## Disclaimer

- Never show your authentication tokens in presentations ;-)
- Proof-of-Concept
  - No TLS in this demo!
  - Only symmetric crypto for validating JWTs for now (HMAC-SHA256)
  - Only “stone” level right now (proving absence of runtime errors TBD)
- Not a solution for availability!

# Component-based architecture


## Trusted computing base

- The **TLS validator** has **3618 SLOC\***:
  - Ada: 2836 (78.39%)
  - Cpp: 782 (21.61%)
- The **overall** Trusted Computing Base is **~37000 SLOC\***:
  - Components: validator, microkernel, core, init, dynamic linker, RTC driver
  - cpp: 33318 (91.27%)
  - ada: 2836 (7.77%)
  - asm: 352 (0.96%)

\*) generated using 'SLOCCount' by David A. Wheeler.

# Component-based architecture

## But, performance?



# Performance Evaluation Setup

## ■ Client

- Intel Core i5-M520, 2.4 GHz
- Intel 82577LM GiB Ethernet
- Debian 9.4, x86\_64
- Lighttpd 1.4.45-1

## ■ ab (Apache Benchmark)



- version 2.4.25-3+deb9u4
- 6 concurrent requests
- 1000 requests  
1k, 10k, 100k, 1M

## ■ Evaluation Setup

1. Internet
2. Local webserver
3. Local webserver through **passthrough** JWT validator
4. Local webserver through **real** JWT validator



# Performance Evaluation Results



Mean latency between request [ms]

# Component-based architecture

## Reimplement? Reuse? Both!

- Component-based systems and program verification fit together very well!
- **Confidentiality & integrity**
  - No need to verify large code bases
  - Reuse of large parts of the architecture
  - Minimal trusted computing base
  - Performance: Promising, but needs evaluation in realistic setup



# Component-based architecture

## What else?

- Everything you saw is open source – try it!
- **JWX library for parsing JWTs (and more)**
  - <https://github.com/Componolit/jwx>
- **Demo**
  - `examples/authproxy.adb` (in JWT repository)
- **Libsparkcrypto**
  - <https://github.com/Componolit/libsparkcrypto>
- **Genode OS Framework**
  - <https://github.com/genodelabs/genode>
- **SPARK**
  - <https://www.adacore.com/download>

**Questions?**



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