AdaCore Technologies for

FACE™ Software Developers

Supporting the Future Airborne Capability Environment™

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The AdaCore Technologies Series

The AdaCore Technologies Series is a collection of books targeted to software developers in critical domains. Each book explains how the Ada and SPARK programming languages, together with AdaCore’s products, can reduce system life cycle costs and facilitate conformance with applicable software certification standards. Current titles in the series:

- *AdaCore Technologies for CENELEC EN 50128:2011*  
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- *AdaCore Technologies for FACE™ Software Developers*  
  by Benjamin M. Brosgol & Dudrey Smith

AdaCore has also prepared a variety of texts introducing Ada and SPARK to developers familiar with other language technologies, including Embedded C, MISRA C, C++, and Java.

All are available for download at [https://www.adacore.com/books](https://www.adacore.com/books).  
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Foreword

AdaCore is a Principal Member of The Open Group’s Future Airborne Capability Environment™ (FACE) Consortium. We have been actively involved with the FACE effort since 2012, participating in and contributing to both the Technical and Business Working Groups.

Our objective in the FACE Consortium is to help FACE software suppliers meet assurance requirements for reliability, safety, and security while realizing the portability and reusability benefits that come from FACE conformance. Among the languages that are called out in the FACE Technical Standard – C, C++, Ada and Java – the one that best promotes high assurance coupled with code portability is Ada.

As a software tool provider to the Aerospace and Defense community, we offer products that enable and encourage FACE software suppliers to use Ada for their applications. More specifically, AdaCore’s FACE related products include:

- GNAT Pro Ada development environments targeted to RTOSes supplied by FACE Consortium members, such as Wind River’s VxWorks 653 and Lynx Software Technologies’ LynxOS-178;
- Efficient run-time libraries that are distributed with our cross-compilation environments and have been deployed in avionics systems certified at the highest Design Assurance Levels (DALs) of software standards such as DO-178B/C; and
- Static analysis tools including the formal methods-based and CWE-compatible SPARK Pro toolsuite, the CWE-compatible CodePeer deep static analyzer for Ada, and the GNATcheck coding standard verifier for Ada.

This book summarizes AdaCore’s technologies and shows how they can help avionics suppliers develop and verify high-assurance FACE conformant software. The discussion is based on Edition 3.1 of the FACE Technical Standard and applies also to earlier versions.

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1 Introduction

The term “software crisis” was coined in the late 1960s and in general refers to the difficulty in producing, within budget, software that meets its requirements. “Chronic condition” may be a more apt term than “crisis”, since the problem of costly but unreliable software-intensive systems persists to this day. Despite (or perhaps in some cases because of) advances in both hardware and software technology, software too often remains frustratingly expensive to develop, verify, maintain, and port from one platform to another.

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has not been immune to this issue, and in 2010 a group was chartered to address a specific and significant contributing factor: software that depends on platform-specific features, such as Real-Time Operating System (RTOS)-functionality or peripheral device characteristics, and that is therefore expensive to update for reuse in other contexts.

Thus was born the Future Airborne Capability Environment™ and the FACE™ Consortium, under the auspices of The Open Group, comprising representatives from the government, defense contractors, and suppliers of platform infrastructure and third-party tool suites such as RTOSes and integrated software development environments. The idea was to exploit recognized software engineering principles in defining a standard software architecture and associated data model, and to leverage common open standards such as POSIX [IEEE 2017], ARINC 653 [ARINC 2019], and IDL [OMG 2018], in order to lower the cost of reusing airborne software components across multiple programs and platforms. The FACE approach accordingly defines a set of requirements for component reuse, and conformance procedures for certifying that a component meets these requirements.

It’s important to realize what the FACE approach is not intended to do: namely, to demonstrate that a software component satisfies its functional requirements, or that it meets the objectives of a specific airworthiness standard such as MIL-HDBK-516C [DoD 2014] or DO-178C [RTCA 2011]. These are obviously important but are outside the scope of the FACE effort, and suppliers of FACE conformant software will need to separately show compliance with such standards.

A software supplier developing a component that is designed for FACE conformance (known as a Unit of Conformance, or UoC) therefore needs to meet two challenges in practice:

- Demonstrating that the UoC is indeed FACE conformant (and more generally meets the underlying goal of code portability), and
- Showing that the UoC meets project-specific requirements beyond FACE conformance-- in particular, verifying functional correctness or other assurance properties such as safety and/or security.

This book explains how AdaCore’s tools and technologies help meet these challenges.
2 The FACE Approach

The Preface to the FACE Technical Standard [OG 2020] sets the context:

*The FACE approach addresses the affordability initiatives of today’s military aviation domain. The FACE approach is to develop a Technical Standard for a software COE [Common Operating Environment] designed to promote portability and create software product lines across the military aviation domain. Several components comprise the FACE approach to software portability and reuse:

- Business processes to adjust procurement and incentivize industry
- Technical practices to promote development of reusable software components
- A software standard to promote the development of portable components between differing avionics architectures

The FACE approach allows software-based “capabilities” to be developed as software components that are exposed to other software components through defined interfaces. It also provides for the reuse of software across different hardware configurations.

Ultimately, the FACE key objectives are to reduce development costs, integration costs, and time-to-field for avionics capabilities.

This chapter summarizes the principal elements of the FACE approach.

2.1 The FACE Reference Architecture

The FACE technical approach is embodied in the FACE Technical Standard and basically comprises a reference architecture, open interfaces, and a common data architecture to facilitate inter-component communication. The current version of the Technical Standard is Edition 3.1, and several older editions (2.0, 2.1, 2.1.1, and 3.0) are in use and supported.

The FACE reference architecture captures a longstanding principle of software engineering: a component should be designed with a clear separation between its *interface*, which is stable and defines the services that the component provides to other components, and its *implementation*, which may change as the system evolves. That separation, sometimes known as *encapsulation*, makes it easier to port the component, along with any client code that uses the services of that component, to a new platform. The implementation of the component might need to be adapted, but the interface and the client code can stay the same.

The FACE software architecture is essentially an application of that principle to airborne systems. As shown in Figure 1, it comprises several layers, or *segments*, which abstract a system’s platform-independent interfaces from its platform-dependent behavior:
### Operating System Segment (OSS)

The OSS is the software foundation for the other FACE segments and supplies services for partitioning, process/thread management, and memory management. It may also include functionality such as health monitoring, fault management, and life cycle management.

### Input/Output Services Segment (IOSS)

The IOSS provides a standard interface between PSSS UoCs and the IO devices supplied for a given platform.

### Platform-Specific Services Segment (PSSS)

The PSSS comprises device services, common services (e.g., logging, device protocol mediation), and graphics services. These supply a standard interface between PCS UoCs and the IOSS.

### Transport Services Segment (TSS)

The TSS supplies communication services for UoCs from other segments, including distribution, routing, state persistence, and data conversion.
• **Portable Components Segment (PCS).** A PCS UoC supplies specific application functionality / “business logic”, independent of the specifics of the underlying hardware and sensors and not tied to a specific data transport or OS implementation. A PCS UoC thus uses only the TSS Interface for data communication and only the OSS Interface for OS support.

A Unit of Portability (UoP) is a UoC in the PCS or PSSS.

Different parts of an airborne system that are developed independently may need to communicate, which raises several issues:

• **Multilanguage interoperability.** Different UoCs may be written in different languages; the FACE Technical Standard specifically calls out C, C++, Ada (both Ada 95 and Ada 2012), and Java. Data cannot, in general, be passed directly between components in different languages, since the formatting conventions may differ. The FACE Technical Standard addresses this issue by requiring PCS UoCs to communicate through TSS functions, and by expressing the TSS interfaces in a language-agnostic manner, through IDL. An IDL compiler will then generate appropriate specifications / header files in the UoC’s programming language, which may be different for the sending and receiving UoC. The TSS function will perform the necessary data conversion.

• **Data view consistency.** Communicating components need to have the same interpretation of the data being sent: if one UoC is sending position data as WGS-84 longitude-latitude-altitude, but the receiving UoC is expecting earth-centered rectangular (XYZ) coordinates, then the mismatch needs to be identified early in the software life cycle. The FACE Technical Standard addresses this issue through data architecture requirements. The data architecture is expressed in the FACE Data Model Language, which is based on the Open Universal Domain Description Language (Open UDDL). The FACE Data Model Language “enforces a multi-level approach to modelling entities and their associations at the conceptual, logical, and platform levels, enabling gradual and varying degrees of abstraction” [OG 2020, §3.3.2]. The FACE conformance procedures include a Shared Data Model (SDM) expressed in the Face Data Model Language, and each PCS UoC using TSS interfaces needs to furnish a UoP Supplied Model (USM). The USM can be based on a Domain-Specific Data Model (DSDM) consistent with the FACE SDM.

• **Initialization / “loose coupling”**. The TSS defines a variety of data types and interfaces, and a UoC needs a handle on the implementation of the TSS interfaces that it uses. To avoid an unwanted coupling between the “client” UoC and a specific implementation of the TSS service that it needs, the FACE Technical Standard defines an IDL template for the Injectable interface, parameterized by interface type, which embodies the “dependency injection” software design pattern. This template (and thus each instance) defines a basic Set_Reference function, called during startup, to supply the reference to the implementation of the requested interface [OG 2020, §I.1].

### 2.2 The OSS and Its Interface

An application can use a variety of run-time services: memory management, concurrency control, exception handling, I/O, and so on. These have traditionally been a source of code non-portability, with
calls on platform-dependent or RTOS vendor-specific APIs. The FACE reference architecture’s OS Segment (Figure 2) addresses this issue in several ways:

- **Standard industry APIs.** The FACE Technical Standard piggybacks on the widely used POSIX and ARINC 653 APIs for run-time functionality. These are very comprehensive APIs, and an application with safety or security requirements needs to restrict itself to a subset, or what FACE calls a “profile”, which provides the necessary determinism and time and/or space partitioning. Profiles are described in more detail below.

- **Standard language syntax for run-time functionality.** The FACE Technical Standard reflects the reality that run-time services are sometimes invoked not through explicit function calls on an API but rather through programming language syntax. For example, an Ada application would typically create threads and manage inter-thread communication using the language’s tasking features, which are compiled into calls on run-time library functions provided by the compiler vendor. Programming language run-time support libraries are thus considered to be part of the OSS when (as is typically the case) the interface to their services is through standard language syntax rather than FACE APIs.

The run-time library for a language like Ada, C++, or Java differs from the other OSS components in a critical way. Rather than being specified by an API invoked explicitly from UoC source code – which would be overly constraining, given the differences across compiler implementations – the interface to the run-time is defined by a set of standard language features (a so-called capability set). Portability of a UoC at the source code level is achieved not by calls on a POSIX or ARINC 653 API but rather through standard language syntax that every compiler will accept.

The implementation of a language’s run-time library may or may not be implemented through calls on the FACE APIs. More generally the interface between an OSS component and the lower-level services needed in its implementation (the so-called “Bottom-side” interface) is not defined or constrained by the FACE Technical Standard.

The lowest layer of the Operating System Segment comprises the implementation of the various services. These are not defined by the FACE Technical Standard and may in turn make use of low-level functions that are platform dependent.
2.3 Profiles
FACE conformant components can be deployed in a variety of contexts with differing requirements for safety and/or security. The FACE Technical Standard therefore defines a set of profiles (API subsets) for the OSS interface. In increasing order of generality:

- **Security**: This is a minimal interface, designed to support applications with high security assurance requirements running in a single address space (e.g., a POSIX process or ARINC 653 partition). It guarantees real-time deterministic behavior and requires time and space partitioning.

- **Safety**: This consists of two sub-profiles, Safety Base and Safety Extended, which are aimed at systems with safety certification requirements. Both Safety Sub-profiles guarantee real-time deterministic behavior, require ARINC 653 support, and also require time and space partitioning. The Safety Base Sub-profile supports single POSIX process applications; the Safety-Extended Sub-profile includes optional support for multiple POSIX processes.

- **General-purpose**: In this profile real-time determinism is not guaranteed, space partitioning is required, and time partitioning is optional. The general-purpose profile is geared toward components at low levels of safety/security assurance. ARINC 653 support and multiple POSIX processes are optional.

2.4 Capability Sets
The rationale underlying the provision of OSS profiles – higher assurance levels imply restrictions on generality – also applies to the programming language(s) used to code the UoC. The FACE Technical Standard thus defines corresponding sets of restrictions (“capability sets”) for C, C++, Ada, and Java; in order of increasing generality:
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- Safety-Base & Security
- Safety-Extended
- General-Purpose

The Security and Safety capability sets specify subsets of run-time functionality and also restrict other General-Purpose features that could be problematic at higher assurance levels. For each capability set, the functionality supported across the different languages is roughly comparable. For example, dynamic allocation is allowed but deallocation is forbidden\(^1\) in the Safety Base & Security capability sets for C++, Ada 95, and Ada 2012.

Edition 3.1 of the FACE Technical Standard separately defines the capability sets for Ada 95 and Ada 2012. These are compatible in the sense that an Ada program satisfying the Ada 95 capability set restrictions will also satisfy the Ada 2012 restrictions. All Ada 2012 capability sets allow contract-based programming, a language feature for augmenting code contracts such as subprograms with program state assertions that can be verified either with run-time checks or, via appropriate tool support, through static analysis.

A software supplier producing a UoC that invokes OSS services needs to decide which profile / capability set the UoC is designed to target. The UoC is then prohibited from invoking APIs that are excluded by that profile and is analogously prohibited from using language features excluded by the corresponding capability set.

### 2.5 Conformance Verification

The FACE Conformance Program defines the processes to verify, certify, and provide formal recognition that registered software conforms to the FACE Technical Standard. The first step, verification, is a “technical evaluation of the software against the FACE Technical Standard ... [and] is completed by an approved FACE VA [Verification Authority]” [OG 2016, §2.2].

The basis of the verification process is the Conformance Verification Matrix (CVM), a spreadsheet that enumerates each requirement in the FACE Technical Standard and specifies:

- the segment(s) to which the requirement applies,
- the verification method to be used (inspection or test),
- the conformance artifacts to be prepared, and
- any conditional requirements (e.g., the applicable profile(s) or programming language).

For example, Requirement 449 in the CVM for the FACE Technical Standard Edition 3.0 [OG 20xx] relates to the permitted usage of Ada 95 features:

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\(^1\) The ability to allocate but not deallocate dynamic memory leaves open the possibility of storage leakage, an obvious hazard / vulnerability. For airworthiness certification the UoC supplier would need to demonstrate how storage leakage would be prevented (e.g., by showing that no dynamic allocation occurs after system initialization), but this is outside the scope of the FACE requirements.
1. UoCs using an Ada Run-Time supplied by the OS shall be restricted to the Programming Language features for the selected capability set.

This requirement applies to UoCs in the PSSS, PCS, TSS, and IOSS and is to be verified by Inspection. The conformance artifact is a “Fully Tested Requirement”, i.e., evidence from the inspection (which could be the result of a static analysis tool). The conditional requirement is “Ada programming language”.

More generally, verifying conformance entails testing and, in particular, running the Conformance Test Suite (CTS) as described in the Conformance Certification Guide [OG 2016, §2.4].

The FACE Conformance Program focuses on the portability of software, not the functionality. The FACE Conformance Program does not require the execution of the software. The UoC source code is compiled to a single target by the Software Supplier. The resulting object code is delivered to the VA and is analyzed for conformance through a linking process to ensure the compiled code will interface with other FACE UoCs. Only a linking of the object code is performed; the interfaces are not executed as part of this test.

And more specifically [OG 2016, §3.2.3]:

The Test Suite is a program that evaluates a UoC against the FACE Technical Standard. This is performed in two ways:

- An evaluation is performed by linking the UoC object code to sample applications that provide FACE conformant interfaces. Any failed linking is identified as non-conformance to the standard.
- The UoC Data Model files are analyzed by the Test Suite against the FACE Technical Standard. Any failure in this analysis is identified as a non-conformance to the standard.

The test cases thus are intended to demonstrate that, first, the UoC provides the services that are required, and, second, it does not use any interfaces that are prohibited in the profile / capability set that is targeted. For a UoC in the PCS, FACE conformance means that reusing the UoC in another platform with a FACE conformant RTOS may be as simple as recompiling the source code.
3 Programming Languages for High-Assurance FACE Software

This chapter explains how FACE software developers can benefit from the Ada language and its formally analyzable SPARK subset. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, the Ada discussion applies to both Ada 95 and Ada 2012.

3.1 Ada

The choice of programming language(s) is one of the fundamental decisions during software design. The source code is the artifact that is developed, verified, and maintained, and it is also the subject of much of the analysis / inspection required for certification against domain-specific standards. Although in principle almost any programming language could be used to develop high-assurance software, in practice software life-cycle costs are reduced when the chosen language has been explicitly designed for reliability, safety and security.

The FACE Technical Standard specifically cites four candidate languages – C, C++, Ada, and Java – and, of these, Ada best meets the needs of high-assurance systems. Ada is especially suitable for UoCs that need to conform to the security profile or one of the safety profiles, avoiding C and C++ vulnerabilities such as buffer overrun and integer overflow, and also avoiding Java’s nondeterminism issues (garbage collection, implementation-dependent thread semantics).

Ada helps meet high-assurance requirements through its support for sound software engineering practice, compile-time checks that enforce type safety, and the enforcement of dynamic constraints such as array index bounds and scalar ranges. As will be explained below, the SPARK subset of Ada shares these benefits, with the added advantage that the dynamic constraints are enforced through mathematics-based static analysis, thereby avoiding run-time overhead.

3.1.1 Ada language overview

Ada is multi-faceted. From one perspective it is a classical stack-based general-purpose language (i.e., unlike languages like Java, it does not require garbage collection), and it is not tied to any specific development methodology. It offers:

- a simple syntax designed for human readability;
- structured control statements;
- flexible data composition facilities;
- strong type checking;
- traditional features for code modularization (“subprograms”);
- standard support for “programming in the large” and module reuse (packages, Object-Oriented Programming, child libraries, generic templates);
- a mechanism for detecting and responding to exceptional run-time conditions (“exception handling”); and
high-level concurrency support (“tasking”) along with a deterministic subset (the Ravenscar profile) appropriate in applications that need to meet high-assurance certification requirements.

The language standard also includes:

- an extensive predefined environment with support for I/O, string handling, math functions, containers (Ada 2012), and more;
- a standard mechanism for interfacing with other programming languages (such as C and C++); and
- specialized needs annexes for functionality in several domains (Systems Programming, Real-Time Systems, Distributed Systems, Numerics, Information Systems, and High-Integrity Systems).

Portability is the driving force behind the FACE approach and was also a key goal for Ada. The challenge for a programming language is to define the semantics in a platform-independent manner but not sacrifice run-time efficiency. Ada achieves this in several ways.

- Ada provides a high-level model for concurrency (tasking), memory management, and exception handling, with standard semantics across all platforms that can be mapped to the most efficient services provided by the target system. This is entirely consistent with the treatment of language run-times in the FACE Reference Architecture.
- The developer can express the logical properties of a type (such as integer range, floating-point precision, and record fields/types) in a machine-independent fashion, which the compiler can then map to an efficient underlying representation.
- The physical representation of data structures (layout, alignment, and addresses) is sometimes specified by system requirements, and Ada allows this to be defined in the program logic but separated from target-dependent properties for ease of maintenance.
- Platform-specific characteristics such as machine word size are encapsulated in an API, so that references to these values are through a standard syntax. Likewise, Ada defines a standard type Address and associated operations, again facilitating the portability of low-level code.

3.1.2 Ada language background

Ada was designed for large, long-lived applications – and embedded systems in particular – where reliability, maintainability, and efficiency are essential. Under sponsorship of the U.S. Department of Defense, the language was originally developed in the early 1980s (this version is generally known as Ada 83) by a team led by Jean Ichbiah at CII-Honeywell-Bull in France. Ada was revised and enhanced in an upward-compatible fashion in the early 1990s, under the leadership of Tucker Taft from Intermetrics in the U.S. The resulting language, Ada 95, was the first internationally standardized object-oriented language. Under the auspices of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), a further (minor) revision was completed as an amendment to the standard; this version of the language is known as Ada 2005. Additional features (including support for contract-based programming in the form of subprogram pre- and postconditions and type invariants) were added in the most recent version of the
language standard, Ada 2012 (see [ACAA 2016], [Ba 2014], or [Ba 2015] for information about Ada). A new version, termed “Ada 202x”, is in progress and is expected to be completed in 2021 or 2022.

The name “Ada” is not an acronym; it was chosen in honor of Augusta Ada Lovelace (1815-1852), a mathematician who is sometimes regarded as the world’s first programmer because of her work with Charles Babbage. She was also the daughter of the poet Lord Byron.

The Ada language has a long and continuing worldwide usage in high-assurance / safety-critical / high-security domains including military and commercial aircraft avionics, air traffic control, space applications, railroad systems, and other domains (such as automotive and medical) where software failures can have catastrophic consequences. With its embodiment of modern software engineering principles Ada is especially appropriate for teaching in both introductory and advanced computer science courses, and it has been the subject of significant university research, especially in the area of real-time technologies.

AdaCore has a long history and close connection with the Ada programming language. Company members worked on the original Ada 83 design and review and played key roles in the Ada 95 project as well as the subsequent revisions. The initial GNAT compiler was delivered at the time of the Ada 95 language’s standardization, thus guaranteeing that users would have a quality implementation for transitioning to Ada 95 from Ada 83 or other languages.

The following subsections provide additional detail on Ada language features.

3.1.3 Scalar ranges
Unlike languages based on C (such as C++, Java, and C#), Ada allows the programmer to simply and explicitly specify the range of values that are permitted for variables of scalar types (integer, floating-point, fixed-point, and enumeration types). The attempted assignment of an out-of-range value causes a run-time error. The ability to specify range constraints makes programmer intent explicit and makes it easier to detect a major source of coding and user input errors. It also provides useful information to static analysis tools and facilitates automated proofs of program properties.

Here’s an example of an integer scalar range:

```
Score : Integer range 1..100;
N     : Integer;
...
Score := N;
-- A run-time check verifies that N is within the range 1 through 100, inclusive
-- If this check fails, a Constraint_Error exception is raised
```

3.1.4 Contract-based programming
Ada 2012 allows extending a subprogram specification or a type/subtype declaration with a contract (a Boolean assertion). Subprogram contracts take the form of preconditions and postconditions. Through
contracts the developer can formalize the intended behavior of the application, and can verify this behavior by testing, static analysis, or formal proof.

Here’s a skeletal example that illustrates contact-based programming; a Table object is a fixed-length container for distinct Float values.

```ada
package Table_Pkg is
type Table is private; -- Encapsulated type

function Is_Full (T : in Table) return Boolean;
function Contains (T : in Table; Item : in Float) return Boolean;

procedure Insert (T : in out Table; Item: in Float)
  with Pre => not Is_Full(T) and not Contains(T, Item),
        Post => Contains(T, Item);

procedure Remove (T : in out Table; Item: in Float);
  with Pre => Contains(T, Item),
           Post => not Contains(T, Item);
...
private
  ... -- Full declaration of Table
end Table_Pkg;
```

A compiler option controls whether the pre- and post-conditions are checked at run time. If checks are enabled, a failure raises the Assertion_Error exception.

Ada 2012 goes further still, allowing type invariants and subtype predicates to specify precisely what is and isn’t valid for any particular (sub)type, including composite types such as records and arrays. For example, one can easily specify that field Max_A in the Launching_Pad structure below is the maximal value of angle allowed given the distance D to the center of the launching pad and the height H of the rocket, with the guarantee that automatic run-time checks will be inserted by the compiler to verify this predicate as well as constraints on the individual fields:

```ada
type Launching_Pad is record
  D, H : Length;
  Max_A : Angle;
end record
  with Predicate => Angle (Arctan (H, D)) <= Max_A;
```

### 3.1.5 Programming in the large

The original Ada 83 design introduced the package construct, a feature that supports encapsulation (“information hiding”) and modularization, and which allows the developer to control the namespace that is accessible within a given compilation unit. Ada 95 introduced the concept of “child units,” adding
considerable flexibility and easing the design of very large systems. Ada 2005 extended the language’s modularization facilities by allowing mutual references between package specifications, thus making it easier to interface with languages such as Java.

3.1.6 Generic templates
A key to reusable components is a mechanism for parameterizing modules with respect to data types and other program entities, for example a stack package for an arbitrary element type. Ada meets this requirement through a facility known as “generics”; since the parameterization is done at compile time, run-time performance is not penalized. Ada generics are analogous to C++ templates, but with considerably more compile-time checking.

3.1.7 Object-Oriented Programming (OOP)
Ada 83 was object-based, allowing the partitioning of a system into modules (packages) corresponding to abstract data types or abstract objects. Full OOP support was not provided since, first, it seemed not to be required in the real-time domain that was Ada’s primary target, and second, the apparent need for automatic garbage collection in an OO language would have interfered with predictable and efficient performance.

However, large real-time systems often have components such as graphical user interfaces (GUIs) that do not have real-time constraints and that could be most effectively developed using OOP features. In part for this reason, Ada 95 added comprehensive support for OOP, through its “tagged type” facility: classes, polymorphism, inheritance, and dynamic binding. These features do not require automatic garbage collection; instead, definitional features introduced by Ada 95 allow the developer to supply type-specific storage reclamation operations (“finalization”). Ada 2005 brought additional OOP features including Java-like interfaces and traditional X.P(...) notation for invoking operation P(...) on object X.

Ada is methodologically neutral and does not impose a “distributed overhead” for OOP. If an application does not need OOP, then the OOP features do not have to be used, and there is no run-time penalty.

See [Ba 2014] or [Ad 2016] for more details.

3.1.8 Concurrent programming
Ada supplies a structured, high-level facility for concurrency. The unit of concurrency is a program entity known as a “task.” Tasks can communicate implicitly via shared data or explicitly via a synchronous control mechanism known as the rendezvous. A shared data item can be defined abstractly as a “protected object” (a feature introduced in Ada 95), with operations executed under mutual exclusion when invoked from multiple tasks. Asynchronous task interactions are also supported, specifically timeouts and task termination. Such asynchronous behavior is deferred during certain operations, to prevent the possibility of leaving shared data in an inconsistent state. Mechanisms designed to help take advantage of multi-core architectures were introduced in Ada 2012.
3.1.9 Systems programming
Both in the “core” language and the Systems Programming Annex, Ada supplies the necessary features for low-level / hardware-specific processing. For example, the programmer can specify the bit layout for fields in a record, define alignment and size properties, place data at specific machine addresses, and express specialized code sequences in assembly language. Interrupt handlers can also be written in Ada, using the protected type facility.

3.1.10 Real-time programming
Ada’s tasking facility and the Real-Time Systems Annex support common idioms such as periodic or event-driven tasks, with features that can help avoid unbounded priority inversions. A protected object locking policy is defined that uses priority ceilings; this has an especially efficient implementation in Ada (mutexes are not required) since protected operations are not allowed to block. Ada 95 defined a standard task dispatching policy that basically requires tasks to run until blocked or preempted, and Ada 2005 introduced several others including Earliest Deadline First.

3.1.11 High-integrity systems
With its emphasis on sound software engineering principles Ada supports the development of high-integrity applications, including those that need to be certified against safety standards such as RTCA DO-178C for avionics, CENELEC EN 50128 for rail systems and security standards such as the Common Criteria. For example, strong typing means that data intended for one purpose will only be accessed via operations that are legal for that data item’s type; errors such as treating pointers as integers (or vice versa) are prevented. And Ada’s array bounds checking prevents buffer overrun vulnerabilities that are common in C and C++.

However, the full language may be inappropriate in a safety- or security-critical application, since the generality and flexibility of some features – especially those with complex run-time semantics – complicate analysis and could interfere with traceability / certification requirements. Ada addresses this issue by supplying a compiler directive, pragma Restrictions, that allows constraining the language features to a well-defined subset (for example, excluding dynamic OOP facilities).

The evolution of Ada has seen the continued increase in support for safety-critical and high-security applications. Ada 2005 standardized the Ravenscar Profile [DB 2001], a collection of concurrency features that are powerful enough for real-time programming but simple enough to make certification practical. Ada 2012 introduced contract-based programming facilities, allowing the programmer to specify preconditions and/or postconditions for subprograms, and invariants for encapsulated (private) types. These can serve both for run-time checking and as input to static analysis tools.

In brief, Ada is an internationally standardized language combining object-oriented programming features, well-engineered concurrency facilities, real-time support, and built-in reliability through both compile-time and run-time checks. Ada addresses the real issues facing software developers today and,

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2 Low-level code sometimes needs to defeat the language’s type checking (for example treating a pointer as an integer), and that is allowed in Ada but with explicit syntax that reveals the programmer intent.
with its support for source code portability, run-time efficiency, and program reliability, the language is especially well suited for writing FACE applications.

### 3.2 SPARK

#### 3.2.1 SPARK Basics

SPARK\(^3\) ([MC 2015], [AA 2021]) is a software development technology (programming language and verification toolset) specifically designed for engineering ultra-low defect level applications, for example where safety and/or security are key requirements. SPARK Pro is the commercial-grade offering of the SPARK technology developed by AdaCore, Altran, and Inria. As will be discussed below, the main component in the toolset is GNATprove, which performs formal verification on SPARK code.

SPARK has an extensive industrial track record. Since its inception in the late 1980s it has been used worldwide in a range of industrial applications such as civil and military avionics, air traffic management / control, railway signaling, cryptographic software, medical devices, automotive systems, and cross-domain solutions. SPARK 2014 is the most recent version of the technology.

The SPARK language is a large subset of Ada 2012. It includes as much of the Ada language as is possible / practical to analyze formally, while eliminating sources of undefined and implementation-dependent behavior. SPARK includes Ada’s program structure support (packages, generics, child libraries), most data types, safe pointers, contract-based programming (subprogram pre- and postconditions, scalar ranges, type/subtype predicates), Object-Oriented Programming, and the Ravenscar subset of the tasking features.

Principal exclusions are side effects in functions and expressions, problematic aliasing of names, exception handling, and most tasking features.

Two major design goals of SPARK are the provision of an *unambiguous* and *formal* semantics, which therefore permits the *soundness* of static verification: i.e., the absence of “false negatives”. If the SPARK tools report that a program does not have a specific vulnerability, such as a reference to an uninitialized variable, then that conclusion can be trusted with mathematical certainty. Soundness builds confidence in the tools, provides evidence-based assurance, completely removes many classes of dangerous defects, and significantly simplifies subsequent verification effort (e.g., testing), owing to less rework, and in some cases can eliminate these activities entirely.

SPARK offers the flexibility of configuring the language on a per-project basis. Restrictions can be fine-tuned based on the relevant coding standards or run-time environments.

SPARK code can easily be combined with full Ada code or with C, so that new systems can be built on and reuse legacy codebases. Moreover, the same code base can have some sections in SPARK and

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\(^3\) Note that this language / technology is totally unrelated to the Apache SPARK analytics framework, or the SPARC CPU Instruction Set Architecture.
others excluded from SPARK analysis (and indeed SPARK and non-SPARK code can be mixed in the same package or subprogram).

Software verification typically involves extensive testing, including unit tests and integration tests. Traditional testing methodologies are a major contributor to the high delivery costs for safety-critical software. Furthermore, testing can never be complete and thus may fail to detect errors. SPARK addresses this issue by allowing automated proof to be used to demonstrate program integrity properties up to functional correctness at the subprogram level, either in combination with or as a replacement for unit testing. In the high proportion of cases where proofs can be discharged automatically the cost of writing unit tests may be completely avoided. Moreover, verification by proofs covers all execution conditions and not just a sample.

Figure 3 shows an example of SPARK code.

```ada
N : Positive := 100; -- N constrained to 1 .. Integer'Last

procedure Decrement (X : in out Integer)
  with Global => (Input => N),
            Depends => (X => (X, N)),
            Pre     => X >= Integer'First + N,
            Post    => X = X'Old - N;

procedure Decrement (X : in out Integer) is
begin
  X := X - N;
end Decrement;
```

The “with” constructs, known as “aspects”, here define the Decrement procedure’s contracts:
- Global: the only access to non-local data is to read the value of N
- Depends: the value of X on return depends only on N and the value of X on entry
- Pre: a Boolean condition that the procedure assumes on entry
- Post: a Boolean condition that the subprogram guarantees on return

In this example the SPARK tool can verify the Global and Depends contracts and can also prove several dynamic properties: no run-time errors will occur during execution of the Decrement procedure, and, if the Pre contract is met when the procedure is invoked then the Post contract will be satisfied on return.

Although SPARK (and the SPARK proof tools) work with Ada 2012 syntax, a SPARK program can also be expressed in Ada 95, with contracts captured as pragmas. A usage scenario, if a FACE component developer is applying the SPARK technology in an otherwise all-Ada 95 context, would be to write the SPARK contracts as pragmas, limiting expressions to those permitted in Ada 95. SPARK’s “ghost variable” facility – the use of temporary variables that are only used for proofs and do not exist at run time – is useful here.
3.2.2 SPARK and the Ada Safety capability sets

The Ada 95 and Ada 2012 Safety capability sets (and indeed the capability sets for the other programming languages supported by the FACE Technical Standard) are not intended as style-oriented coding rules, but they do prohibit features with complex run-time semantics and also restrict functionality that could be problematic in a safety-critical system. These goals are consistent with SPARK, and in fact a SPARK program will automatically comply with many of the restrictions imposed by the Ada Safety capability sets. For example, the tasking features in SPARK are those that are allowed by the Ravenscar profile, which is also the tasking subset permitted in the Ada Safety capability sets. In those cases where SPARK permits a feature that is outside the Ada capability sets, the FACE component developer has several techniques to detect and eliminate the excluded feature:

- **pragma Restrictions**
  
  This standard Ada pragma allows the user to specify language features that the compiler will reject. The pragma can prohibit dependence on all of the run-time packages excluded from the Ada Safety capability sets (Ada.Wide_Text_IO, etc.) and also prohibit or restrict the usage of exceptions and allocators.

- **Static analysis tool (code standard enforcer)**
  
  The other restrictions in the Ada Safety capability sets are Ada semantic features that can be detected by an automated tool such as GNATcheck (see page 35). The FACE UoC developer can configure this rule-based and tailorable tool to flag Ada capability set violations such as usage of specific prohibited types or subprograms defined in otherwise-permitted packages.

The Ada compiler and SPARK proof tools will enforce compliance with the SPARK language definition, and a combination of Ada’s pragma Restrictions and an automated tool such as GNATcheck can enforce the additional FACE capability set restrictions.

3.2.3 Ease of Adoption: Levels of Adoption of Formal Methods

Formal methods are not an “all or nothing” technique; it is possible and in fact advisable for an organization to introduce the methodology in a stepwise manner, with the ultimate level depending on the assurance requirements for the software. This approach is documented in [AT 2020], which details the levels of adoption, including the benefits and costs at each level, based on the practical experience of a major aerospace company in adopting formal methods incrementally; the development team did not have previous knowledge of formal methods. The levels are additive; all the checks at one level are also performed at the next higher level.

In the context of a FACE component, the analysis performed by the SPARK tools would need to be combined with verification of adherence to the Ada Safety capability set restrictions as explained above.

3.2.3.1 Stone level: Valid SPARK

As the first step, a project can implement as much of the code as is possible in the SPARK subset, run the SPARK analyzer on the codebase (or new code), and look at violations. For each violation, the developer
can decide whether to convert the code to valid SPARK or exclude it from analysis. The benefits include easier maintenance for the SPARK modules (no aliasing, no side effects in functions) and project experience with the basic usage of formal methods. The costs include the effort that may be required to convert the code to SPARK (especially if there is heavy use of pointers).

3.2.3.2 Bronze level: Initialization and correct data flow
This level entails performing flow analysis on the SPARK code to verify intended data usage. The benefits include assurance of no reads of uninitialized variables, no interference between parameters and global objects, no unintended access to global variables, and no race conditions on accesses to shared data. The costs include a conservative analysis of arrays (since indices may be computed at run time) and potential “false alarms” that need to be inspected.

3.2.3.3 Silver level: Absence of run-time errors
At the Silver level the SPARK proof tool performs flow analysis, locates all potential run-time checks (e.g., array indexing), and then attempts to prove that none will fail. If the proof succeeds, this brings all the benefits of the Bronze level plus the ability to safely compile the final executable without exception checks. Critical software should aim for this level. The cost is the additional effort needed to obtain provability. In some cases (if the programmer knows that an unprovable check will always succeed, for example because of hardware properties) it may be necessary to augment the code with pragmas to help the prover.

3.2.3.4 Gold level: Proof of key integrity properties
At the Gold level, the proof tool will verify properties such as maintenance of critical data invariants or safe transitions between program states. Subprogram pre- and postconditions and subtype predicates are especially useful here, as is “ghost” code that serves only for verification and is not part of the executable. A benefit is that the proofs can be used for safety case rationale, to replace certain kinds of testing. The cost is increased time for tool execution, and the possibility that some properties may be beyond the abilities of current provers.

3.2.3.5 Platinum level: Full functional correctness
At the Platinum level, the algorithmic code is proved to satisfy its formally specified functional requirements. This is still a challenge in practice for realistic programs but may be appropriate for small critical modules, especially for high-security systems.

3.2.4 Hybrid Verification
The typical scenario for hybrid verification is an in-progress project that is using traditional testing and that has high-assurance requirements that can best be met through formal methods. The new code will be in SPARK; and the adoption level depends on the experience of the project team (typically Stone at the start, then progressing to Bronze or Silver). The existing codebase may be in Ada or other languages. To maximize the precision of the SPARK analysis, the subprograms that the SPARK code will be invoking should have relevant pre- and postconditions expressing the subprograms’ low-level requirements. If the non-SPARK code is not in Ada, then the pre- and postconditions should be included on the Ada subprogram specification corresponding to the imported function; see Figure 4 for an example.
The verification activity depends on whether the formally verified code invokes the tested code, or vice versa.

- The SPARK code calls a tested subprogram
  
  If the tested subprogram has a precondition, then at each call site the SPARK code is checked to see if the precondition is met. Any call that the proof tool cannot verify for compliance with the precondition needs to be inspected to see why the precondition cannot be proved. It could be a problem with the precondition, a problem at the call site, or a limitation of the prover.

  The postcondition of the called subprogram can be assumed to be valid at the point following the return, although the validity needs to be established by testing. In the example shown in Figure 4, testing would need to establish that the `getascii` function only returns a result in the range 0 through 127.

- The SPARK code is invoked from tested code
  
  Testing would need to establish that, at each call, the precondition of the SPARK subprogram is met. Since the SPARK subprogram has been formally verified, at the point of return the subprogram’s postcondition is known to be satisfied. Testing of the non-SPARK code can take advantage of this fact, thereby reducing the testing effort.

Hybrid verification can be performed within a single module; e.g., a package can specify different sections where SPARK analysis is or is not to be performed.

```plaintext
function getascii return Interfaces.C.unsigned_char
with Post => getascii'Result in 0..127;
pragma Import (C, getascii);
-- Interfaces.C.unsigned_char is a modular (unsigned) integer type,
-- typically ranging from 0 through 255

procedure Example is
  N : Interfaces.C.unsigned_char range 0 .. 127;
begin
  N := getascii; -- SPARK can prove that no range check is needed
end Example;

Figure 4: SPARK Code Invoking a Tested C Function
```
4 Tools for FACE Software Development

This chapter explains how FACE software developers can benefit from AdaCore’s products. The advantages stem from reduced life cycle costs for developing and verifying high-assurance airborne software; and more specifically in a FACE context, several tools also help in demonstrating that a UoC conforms with the FACE requirements.

4.1 AdaCore Tools and the Software Life Cycle

The software life cycle is often depicted as a “V” diagram, and Figure 5 shows how AdaCore’s major products fit into the various stages. Although the stages are rarely performed as a single sequential process – the phases typically involve feedback / iteration, and requirements often evolve as a project unfolds – the “V” chart is useful in characterizing the various kinds of activities that occur.

In summary:

- The QGen model-based engineering environment (see page 29) applies during the Systems Requirements and High-Level Design phases. It is based around a qualifiable code generator from a safe subset of Simulink® and Stateflow® models.
- The SPARK Pro static analysis toolsuite (see page 30) applies during Detailed Design and Software Development. It includes a proof tool that verifies properties ranging from correct information flows to functional correctness.

![Figure 5: AdaCore Toolsuites and the “V” Software Life Cycle](image)
The GNAT Pro Ada development environment (see page 32) applies during Detailed Design, Software Development, and Unit Testing. It consists of gcc-based program build tools, an integrated and tailorable graphical user interface, a comprehensive set of static and dynamic analysis tools, and a variety of supplemental libraries.

The CodePeer advanced Ada static analysis tool (see page 38) applies during Software Development. It can be used retrospectively to detect vulnerabilities in existing codebases, and/or during new projects to prevent errors from being introduced.

Dynamic analysis tools (see page 40) apply during Software Development and Unit Testing. One such tool, GNATcoverage, supports code coverage and reporting at various levels of program construct granularity.

The following sections describe the tools in more detail and show how they can assist in developing and verifying FACE conformant software.

4.2 QGen Toolsuite for Model-Based Engineering

QGen is a qualifiable and tunable code generation and model verification toolsuite for a safe subset of Simulink® and Stateflow® models. The selected feature set ensures code generation that is appropriate for critical systems, leaving out features that might result in unpredictable behavior or potentially unsafe source code. The qualifiable QGen code generator translates control system models into source code in either the portable MISRA subset of C, or the SPARK subset of Ada. The generated code is suitable for formal analysis and for projects following software standards such as MIL-HDBK-516C, DO-178C, ISO 26262, or EN 50128.

The QGen tool suite additionally includes both static model verification and interactive model-level debugging of the generated code. The QGen model-level debugger provides a side-by-side view of the model and the generated code, allowing the developer to set breakpoints; to view, update and compare signal values; and to step through execution. The QGen debugger can be used for testing the generated code as well as any hand-written code, on the host or the final target. It allows the user to perform back-to-back comparison against expected values for a block or the model as a whole, while delving into the details of a particular subsystem whenever needed. By displaying the model together with the generated source code, the QGen debugger provides a productive bridge between control engineering and software engineering.

The QGen automatic code generator is being qualified in compliance with the DO-178C / ED-12C standard at Tool Qualification Level 1 (TQL-1), with qualification anticipated in early 2022. Some code generators rely on a separate verification tool to check their generated source code, but QGen at TQL-1 allows developers to use the generated code without any extra steps, streamlining the critical-system development and verification process. With QGen, the supported subset of the modeling language is clearly defined together with the expected structure of the generated code, and is coupled with tests that verify the precise match between model simulation results and the run-time semantics of the generated target code.
Although model-based development of control logic is outside the scope of the FACE Technical Standard, a toolsuite such as QGen can increase the productivity of FACE UoC developers by automating the translation of system requirements into source code. The MISRA-C and SPARK code generated by QGen meet the requirements of all of the FACE profiles and capability sets.

4.3 Static Verification: SPARK Pro

SPARK Pro is an advanced static analysis toolsuite for the SPARK subset of Ada, bringing mathematics-based confidence to the verification of critical code. Built around the GNATprove formal analysis and proof tool, SPARK Pro combines speed, flexibility, depth and soundness, while minimizing the generation of “false alarms”. It can be used for new high-assurance code (including enhancements to or hardening of existing codebases at lower assurance levels, written in full Ada or other languages such as C) or projects where the existing high-assurance coding standard is sufficiently close to SPARK to ease transition.

4.3.1 Powerful Static Verification

The SPARK language supports a wide range of static verification techniques. At one end of the spectrum is basic data- and control-flow analysis, i.e., exhaustive detection of errors such as attempted reads of uninitialized variables, and ineffective assignments (where a variable is assigned a value that is never read). For more critical applications, dependency contracts can constrain the information flow allowed in an application. Violations of these contracts – potentially representing violations of safety or security policies – can then be detected even before the code is compiled.

In addition, SPARK supports mathematical proof and can thus provide high confidence that the software meets a range of assurance requirements: from the absence of run-time exceptions, to the enforcement of safety or security properties, to compliance with a formal specification of the program’s required behavior.

As described earlier (see page 25), the SPARK technology can be introduced incrementally into a project, based on the assurance requirements. Each level, from Bronze to Platinum, comes with associated benefits and costs.

4.3.2 Minimal Run-Time Footprint

For the most secure systems (for example, embedded cryptographic devices), a developer has to worry about and justify the presence of all the code in a delivered system. Guidance talks of “minimizing the trusted computing base”, which really means just making the delivered system as small as possible. There is also the problem of Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) components: if a system uses a COTS library or operating system, then how are these to be evaluated or verified without the close (and probably expensive) cooperation of the COTS vendor?

For the most critical embedded systems, SPARK supports the so-called “Bare-Metal” development style, where SPARK code is running directly on a target processor with little or no COTS libraries or operating system at all. SPARK is also designed to be compatible with GNAT Pro’s Zero FootPrint (ZFP) run-time library. In a Bare-Metal/ZFP development, every byte of object code can be traced to the application’s
source code, and accounted for. This can be particularly useful for systems that must withstand evaluation by a national technical authority or regulator.

SPARK code can also run with a specialized run-time library on top of an RTOS such as Wind River’s VxWorks 653 or Lynx Software Technologies’ LynxOS-178, or with a full Ada run-time library and a commercial desktop operating system. The choice is left to the system designer, not imposed by the language.

4.3.3 SPARK Pro Support for FACE Conformance
The major value that SPARK Pro brings to a software project is the added assurance that comes from formal analysis, but SPARK Pro also offers some specific benefits in the context of FACE certification.

- The tool enforces a number of restrictions in the Ada 95 and Ada 2012 Safety capability sets. For example, the use of tasking constructs outside the Ravenscar subset will be flagged.
- The full Ada language has several implementation dependencies that can result in the same source program yielding different results when compiled by different compilers. For example, the evaluation order in expressions is not specified, and different orderings may produce different values if one of the terms has a side effect. (A complete discussion of this issue and its mitigation may be found in [Br 2021].) Such implementation dependencies are either prohibited in SPARK and thus detected by SPARK Pro, or else they do not affect the computed result. In either case the use of SPARK Pro eases the effort in porting the code from one environment to another, which is a major goal of the FACE approach.

4.3.4 CWE Compatibility
SPARK Pro detects a number of dangerous software errors in The MITRE Corporation’s Common Weakness Enumeration, and the tool has been certified by the MITRE Corporation as a “CWE-Compatible” product [Mi 20xx].

The following table lists the CWE weaknesses detected by SPARK Pro:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CWE Weakness</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CWE 119, 120, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 129, 130, 131</td>
<td>Buffer overflow/underflow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWE 136, 137</td>
<td>Variant record field violation, Use of incorrect type in inheritance hierarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWE 188</td>
<td>Reliance on data layout</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWE 190, 191</td>
<td>Numeric overflow/underflow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWE 193</td>
<td>Off-by-one error</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWE 194</td>
<td>Unexpected sign extension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWE 197</td>
<td>Numeric truncation error</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWE 252, 253</td>
<td>Unchecked or incorrectly checked return value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWE 366</td>
<td>Race Condition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWE 369</td>
<td>Division by zero</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### CWE Weakness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CWE</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>456, 457</td>
<td>Use of uninitialized variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>466, 468, 469</td>
<td>Pointer errors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>476</td>
<td>Null pointer dereference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>562</td>
<td>Return of stack variable address</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>563</td>
<td>Unused or redundant assignment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>682</td>
<td>Range constraint violation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>786, 787, 788, 805</td>
<td>Buffer access errors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>820</td>
<td>Missing synchronization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>821</td>
<td>Incorrect synchronization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>822, 823, 824, 825</td>
<td>Pointer errors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>835</td>
<td>Infinite loop</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.4 GNAT Pro Ada Development Environments

AdaCore’s GNAT Pro language toolsuite comes in several editions. This section summarizes the main features of the Enterprise and Assurance editions, as well as the graphical Integrated Development Environments (IDEs) that accompany GNAT Pro.

#### 4.4.1 GNAT Pro Enterprise

*GNAT Pro Enterprise* is a development environment for producing critical software systems where reliability, efficiency, and maintainability are essential. It is available for Ada, C, and C++.

Based on the GNU GCC technology, the GNAT Pro Enterprise product line supports all versions of the Ada language, from Ada 83 to Ada 2012, as well as features of the in-progress Ada 202x standard. Other editions of the GNAT Pro product handle multiple versions of C (from C89 through C18) and C++ (from C++98 through C++17). GNAT Pro Ada includes an Integrated Development Environment (GNAT Studio and/or GNATbench), a comprehensive toolsuite including a visual debugger, and a set of libraries and bindings.

GNAT Pro Enterprise offers several features that make it especially appropriate for the development of high-assurance FACE conformant systems:

**Run-Time Library Options**

GNAT Pro Ada Enterprise includes a variety of choices for the run-time library, based on the target platform. In addition to the full run-time, which is available for all platforms, the product on some platforms also includes restricted libraries that reduce the footprint and help simplify safety certification:

- The ZFP library (“Zero FootPrint”) offers a minimal application footprint (rivaling that of C) while retaining compatibility with the SPARK subset and verification tools;
- The Cert library is a small-footprint runtime that implements basic exception handling and dynamic storage management for sequential applications;
• The Ravenscar-Cert library augments the Cert library with support for the Ravenscar tasking profile.

Especially relevant to FACE UoC developers:
• The Cert library implements both the Safety-Base / Security and the Safety-Extended capability sets for Ada 95 and Ada 2012 when POSIX pthreads are used rather than Ada tasking;
• Ravenscar-Cert implements these capability sets for applications that use Ada tasking; and
• The full Ada run-time implements the General-Purpose capability set.

AdaCore can supply evidence (results of running the ACATS tests) to demonstrate that the functionality required by the FACE Technical Standard is implemented.

**Enhanced Data Validity Checking**
Improper or absent data validity checking is a notorious source of security vulnerabilities in software systems. Ada has always offered range checks for scalar subtypes, but GNAT Pro goes further, offering enhanced validity checking that can protect a program against malicious or accidental memory corruption, failed I/O devices, and so on. This feature is particularly useful in combination with automatic **Fuzz Testing**, since it offers strong defense for invalid data at the software boundary of a system.

### 4.4.2 GNAT Pro Assurance

**GNAT Pro Assurance** extends GNAT Pro Enterprise with specialized support, such as bug fixes and “known problems” analyses, on a specific version of the toolchain. This product edition is especially suitable for applications with long-lived maintenance cycles or assurance requirements, since critical updates to the compiler or other product components may become necessary years after the initial release.

#### 4.4.2.1 Sustained Branches

Unique to GNAT Pro Assurance is a service known as a “sustained branch”: customized support and maintenance for a specific version of the product. A project on a sustained branch can monitor relevant known problems, analyze their impact, and if needed update to a newer version of the product on the same development branch (i.e., not incorporating changes introduced in later versions of the product).

Sustained branches are a practical solution to the problem of ensuring toolchain stability while allowing flexibility in case an upgrade is needed to correct a critical problem.

#### 4.4.2.2 Source to Object Traceability

Source-to-object traceability is required in standards such as DO-178C, and a GNAT Pro compiler option can limit the use of language constructs that generate object code that is not directly traceable to the source code. As an add-on service, AdaCore can perform an analysis that demonstrates this traceability and justifies any remaining cases of non-traceable code.

### 4.4.3 GNAT Pro Integrated Development Environments (IDEs)

GNAT Pro includes several graphical IDEs for invoking the build tools and accompanying utilities and monitoring their outputs.
4.4.3.1 GNAT Studio

GNAT Studio (formerly named “GNAT Programming Studio” or “GPS”) is a powerful and simple-to-use IDE that streamlines software development from the initial coding stage through testing, debugging, system integration, and maintenance. GNAT Studio is designed to allow programmers to exploit the full capabilities of the GNAT Pro technology.

Tools

GNAT Studio’s extensive navigation and analysis tools can generate a variety of useful information including call graphs, source dependencies, project organization, and complexity metrics, giving the developer a thorough understanding of a program at multiple levels. It allows interfacing with third-party Version Control Systems, easing both development and maintenance.

Robust, Flexible and Extensible

Especially suited for large, complex systems, GNAT Studio can import existing projects from other Ada implementations while adhering to their file naming conventions and retaining the existing directory organization. Through the IDE’s multi-language capabilities, components written in C and C++ can also be handled. GNAT Studio is highly extensible; additional tools can be plugged in through a simple scripting approach. It is also tailorable, allowing various aspects of the program’s appearance to be customized in the editor.

Easy to Learn, Easy to Use

GNAT Studio is intuitive to new users, thanks to its menu-driven interface with extensive online help (including documentation of all the menu selections) and “tool tips”. The Project Wizard makes it simple to get started, supplying default values for almost all of the project properties. For experienced users, GNAT Studio offers the necessary level of control for advanced purposes; e.g., the ability to run command scripts. Anything that can be done on the command line is achievable through the menu interface.

Remote Programming

Integrated into GNAT Studio, Remote Programming provides a secure and efficient way for programmers to access any number of remote servers on a wide variety of platforms while taking advantage of the power and familiarity of their local laptop computers or workstations.

Support for Microsoft’s Language Server Protocol

GNAT Studio’s source navigation engine is implemented through support for Microsoft’s Language Server Protocol (LSP), and it includes a server for this protocol for the Ada and SPARK languages. A language server based on the LSP encapsulates the language-specific knowledge that clients (such as editing tools) can access via standard requests and through inter-process communication. An IDE that supports LSP can handle any language for which a language server is implemented, and in the other direction a language server can be reused in any IDE that supports LSP, such as Visual Studio Code.

4.4.3.2 GNATbench - GNATbench

GNATbench is an Ada development plug-in for Eclipse and Wind River’s Workbench environment. The Workbench integration supports Ada development on a variety of VxWorks real-time operating systems.
The Eclipse version is primarily for native applications, with some support for cross development. In both cases the Ada tools are tightly integrated.

**GNATdashboard**

GNATdashboard serves as a one-stop control panel for monitoring and improving the quality of Ada software. It integrates and aggregates the results of AdaCore’s various static and dynamic analysis tools (GNATmetric, GNATcheck, GNATcoverage, CodePeer, and SPARK Pro, among others) within a common interface, helping quality assurance managers and project leaders understand or reduce their software’s technical debt, and eliminating the need for manual input.

GNATdashboard fits naturally into a continuous integration environment, providing users with metrics on code complexity, code coverage, conformance to coding standards, and more. A FACE UoC developer can use GNATdashboard with GNATcheck, to monitor progress on meeting the Ada capability set constraints.

### 4.4.4 GNAT Pro Support for FACE Conformance

GNAT Pro Ada directly helps UoC developers demonstrate conformance with the FACE requirements. Support comes in several areas:

- Detection of features outside the targeted profile / capability set, via compiler-enforced standard pragmas and a GNAT Pro static analysis tool
  - **pragma** Restrictions
    - This pragma, described earlier (see page 25), identifies language features that are to be prohibited in the program.
  - **pragma** Profile (Ravenscar)
    - This pragma, introduced in Ada 2005, is equivalent to a collection of Restrictions pragmas that define the Ravenscar rules.

- Detection of features outside the targeted profile / capability set, via the GNATcheck static analysis tool (see page 35) supplied with GNAT Pro Ada

- Specialized run-time libraries
  - The Cert and Ravenscar-Cert libraries (see page 32) implement the safety capability sets.

### 4.5 GNAT Pro Ada Tools for Static Analysis

This section describes a number of GNAT Pro Ada tools that perform static analysis of Ada source code. These tools help in general during the verification process, and, as will be noted below, some are particularly useful in demonstrating FACE conformance.

#### 4.5.1 GNATcheck

**GNATcheck** is a coding standard verification tool that is extensible and rule-based. It allows developers to completely define a coding standard as a set of rules, for example a subset of permitted language features. It checks whether a source program satisfies the resulting rules and thereby facilitates demonstration of a system’s conformance with certification standards.
FACE UoC developers can use GNATcheck as a key part of conformance verification, to help demonstrate that their Ada code meets the restrictions imposed by the applicable Capability Set (General-Purpose, Safety-Extended, Safety-Base & Security), for both Ada 95 and Ada 2012. Automating this step through GNATcheck is significantly more efficient and reliable than through manual code inspection.

Key features include:

- An integrated Ada Restrictions mechanism for banning specific features from an application. This can be used to restrict features such as tasking, exceptions, dynamic allocation, fixed- or floating point, input/output, and unchecked conversions.

- Restrictions specific to GNAT Pro, such as banning features that result in the generation of implicit loops or conditionals in the object code, or in the generation of elaboration code.

- Additional Ada semantic rules requested by customers, such as enforcing a specific ordering of parameters, normalizing entity names, and prohibiting subprograms from having multiple returns.

- User-friendly interface for creating and using a complete coding standard.

- Generation of project-wide reports, including evidence of the level of conformance with a given coding standard.

- Over 30 compile-time warnings from GNAT Pro that detect typical error situations, such as local variables being used before being initialized, incorrect assumptions about array lower bounds, infinite recursion, incorrect data alignment, and accidental hiding of names.

- Style checks that allow developers to control indentation, casing, comment style, and nesting level.

4.5.2 GNATmetric

GNATmetric is a static analysis tool that calculates a set of commonly used industry metrics, thus allowing developers to estimate code complexity and better understand the structure of the source program. This information also facilitates satisfying the requirements of certain software development frameworks and is useful in conjunction with GNATcheck (for example in reporting and limiting the maximum subprogram nesting depth).

4.5.3 GNATstack

GNATstack is a software analysis tool that enables Ada/C software development teams to accurately estimate the maximum size of the memory stack required for program execution. Although FACE conformance does not require such an analysis, GNATstack will be useful to FACE UoC developers since a stack overflow in a UoC for high-DAL software could lead to a catastrophic failure.

The GNATstack tool statically computes the maximum stack space required by each task in an application. The reported bounds can be used to reserve sufficient space, resulting in safe execution with respect to stack usage. The tool uses a conservative analysis based on compile-time analysis,
augmented with user-supplied input to deal with complexities such as subprogram recursion, while avoiding unnecessarily pessimistic estimates.

GNATstack exploits data generated by the compiler to compute worst-case stack requirements. It performs per-subprogram stack usage computation combined with control flow analysis.

GNATstack can analyze object-oriented applications, automatically determining maximum stack usage on code that uses dynamic dispatching in Ada. A dispatching call challenges static analysis because the identity of the subprogram being invoked is not known until runtime. GNATstack solves this problem by statically determining the subset of potential targets (primitive operations) for every dispatching call. This significantly reduces the analysis effort and yields precise stack usage bounds on complex Ada code.

GNATstack’s main output is the worst-case stack usage for every entry point, together with the paths that result in these stack sizes. The list of entry points can be automatically computed (all the tasks, including the environment task) or can be specified by the user (a list of entry points or all the subprograms matching a given regular expression).

GNATstack can also detect and display a list of potential problems when computing stack requirements:

- Indirect (including dispatching) calls. The tool will indicate the number of indirect calls made from any subprogram.
- External calls. The tool displays all the subprograms that are reachable from any entry point for which there is no stack or call graph information.
- Unbounded frames. The tool displays all the subprograms that are reachable from any entry point with an unbounded stack requirement. The required stack size depends on the arguments passed to the subprogram. For example:

```ada
procedure P (N : Integer) is
  S : String (1 .. N);
begin
  ...
end P;
```

- Cycles. The tool can detect all the cycles (i.e., potential recursion) in the call graph.

GNATstack allows the user to supply a text file with the missing information, such as the potential targets for indirect calls, the stack requirements for externals calls, and the maximal size for unbounded frames.
4.5.4 Time and Space Analysis

4.5.4.1 Timing Verification
Suitably subsetted, Ada (and SPARK) are amenable to the static analysis of timing behavior. This kind of analysis is relevant for real-time systems, where worst-case execution time (WCET) must be known in order to guarantee that timing deadlines will always be met. Timing analysis is also of interest for secure systems, where the issue might be to show that programs do not leak information via so-called side-channels based on the observation of differences in execution time.

AdaCore does not produce its own WCET tool, but there are several such tools on the market from partner companies, such as RapiTime from Rapita Systems Ltd.

4.5.4.2 Memory Usage Verification
Ada and SPARK can support the static analysis of worst-case memory consumption, so that a developer can show that a program will never run out of memory at execution time.

In both SPARK and Ada, users can specify pragma Restrictions with the standard arguments No_Allocators and No_Implicit_Heap_Allocations. This will completely prevent heap usage, thus reducing memory usage analysis to a worst-case computation of stack usage for each task in a system. Stack size analysis is implemented directly in AdaCore’s GNATstack tool, as described above.

4.5.5 Semantic Analysis Tools—Libadalang
Libadalang is a reusable library that forms a high-performance semantic processing and transformation engine for Ada source code, with an API in Python as well as Ada. It is particularly suitable for writing lightweight and project-specific static analysis tools. Typical libadalang applications include:

- Static analysis (property verification)
- Code instrumentation
- Design documentation tools
- Metric testing or timing tools
- Dependency tree analysis tools
- Type dictionary generators
- Coding standard enforcement tools
- Language translators (e.g., to CORBA IDL)
- Quality assessment tools
- Source browsers and formatters
- Syntax directed editors

4.6 Static Verification: CodePeer
CodePeer is an Ada source code analyzer that detects run-time and logic errors that can cause safety and security vulnerabilities in a code base. CodePeer assesses potential bugs before program execution, serving as an automated peer reviewer. It can be used on existing codebases, thereby helping vulnerability analysis during a security assessment or system modernization, and when performing impact analysis when introducing changes. It can also be used on new projects, helping to find errors
efficiently and early in the development life-cycle. Using control-flow, data-flow, and other advanced static analysis techniques, CodePeer detects errors that would otherwise only be found through labor-intensive debugging.

CodePeer can be used from within the GNAT Pro development environment, or as part of a continuous integration regime. As a stand-alone tool, CodePeer can also be used with projects that do not use GNAT Pro for compilation.

4.6.1 Early Error Detection

CodePeer’s advanced static error detection finds bugs in code by analyzing every line of code, considering every possible input and every path through the program. CodePeer can be used very early in the development life cycle, to identify problems when defects are much less costly to repair. It can also be used retrospectively on existing code bases, to detect latent vulnerabilities. For a FACE UoC developer, the main benefit from CodePeer will come from the tool’s error detection capabilities.

4.6.2 CWE Compatibility

CodePeer can detect a number of “Dangerous Software Errors” in the MITRE Corporation’s Common Weakness Enumeration, and the tool has been certified by The MITRE Corporation as a “CWE-Compatible” product [Mi 20xx].

The following table lists the weaknesses detected by CodePeer:

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Buffer overflow/underflow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWE 136, 137</td>
<td>Variant record field violation, Use of incorrect type in inheritance hierarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWE 190, 191</td>
<td>Numeric overflow/underflow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWE 362, 366</td>
<td>Race condition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWE 369</td>
<td>Division by zero</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWE 457</td>
<td>Use of uninitialized variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWE 476</td>
<td>Null pointer dereference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWE 561</td>
<td>Dead (unreachable) code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWE 563</td>
<td>Unused or redundant assignment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWE 570</td>
<td>Expression is always false</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWE 571</td>
<td>Expression is always true</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWE 628</td>
<td>Incorrect arguments in call</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWE 667</td>
<td>Improper locking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWE 682</td>
<td>Incorrect calculation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 4.7 Dynamic Analysis Tools

Although they do not play a direct role in demonstrating conformance with the FACE requirements, dynamic analysis tools are useful in general as part of the verification process. Their output can serve as evidence towards certification objectives in software standards such as DO-178C.

#### 4.7.1 GNATtest

The GNATtest tool helps create and maintain a complete unit testing infrastructure for projects of any size / complexity. It is based on the concept that each visible subprogram should have at least one corresponding unit test. GNATtest produces two outputs:

- The complete harnessing code for executing all the unit tests under consideration. This code is generated completely automatically.
- A set of separate test stubs for each subprogram to be tested. These test stubs are to be completed by the user.

GNATtest handles Ada’s Object-Oriented Programming features and can help verify tagged type substitutability (the Liskov Substitution Principle), or “LSP”, which can be used to demonstrate consistency of class hierarchies.

#### 4.7.2 GNATemulator

GNATemulator is an efficient and flexible tool that provides integrated, lightweight target emulation.

Based on the QEMU technology, a generic and open-source machine emulator and virtualizer, GNATemulator allows software developers to compile code directly for their target architecture and run it on their host platform, through an approach that translates from the target object code to native instructions on the host. This avoids the inconvenience and cost of managing an actual board, while offering an efficient testing environment compatible with the final hardware.

GNATemulator does not attempt to be a complete time-accurate target board simulator, and thus it cannot be used for all aspects of testing. But it does provide a very efficient and cost-effective way to execute the target code very early in the development and verification processes. GNATemulator thus offers a practical compromise between a native environment that lacks target emulation capability, and a cross configuration where the final target hardware might not be available soon enough or in sufficient quantity.
4.7.3 GNATcoverage

GNATcoverage is a dynamic analysis tool that analyzes and reports program coverage. It computes its results from trace files that show which program constructs have been exercised by a given test campaign. With source code instrumentation, the tool produces these files by executing an alternative version of the program, built from source code instrumented to populate coverage-related data structures. Through an option to GNATcoverage, the user can specify the granularity of the analysis by choosing any of the coverage criteria defined in DO-178C: statement coverage, decision coverage, or Modified Condition / Decision Coverage (MC/DC).

Source-based instrumentation brings several major benefits: efficiency of tool execution (much faster than alternative coverage strategies using binary traces and target emulation, especially on native platforms), compact-size source trace files independent of execution duration, and support for coverage of shared libraries.

4.8 Support and Expertise

Every AdaCore product subscription comes with front-line support provided directly by the product developers themselves, who have deep expertise in the Ada language, software certification standards in several domains, compilation technologies, embedded system technology, and static and dynamic verification. They have extensive experience supporting customers in domains such as commercial and military avionics, railway, space, energy, and air traffic management/control. Customers’ questions (requests for guidance on feature usage, suggestions for technology enhancements, or defect reports) are handled efficiently and effectively.

Beyond this bundled support, AdaCore also provides Ada language and tool training as well as on-site consulting on topics such as how to best deploy the technology, and mentoring assistance on start-up issues. On-demand tool development or ports to new platforms are also available.
## 5 Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Expansion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>API</td>
<td>Application Program Interface</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COE</td>
<td>Common Operating Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COTS</td>
<td>Commercial Off-The Shelf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTS</td>
<td>Conformance Test Suite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVM</td>
<td>Conformance Verification Matrix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAL</td>
<td>Design Assurance Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSDM</td>
<td>Domain-Specific Data Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FACE</td>
<td>Future Airborne Capability Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>GNU Compiler Collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUI</td>
<td>Graphical User Interface</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDE</td>
<td>Integrated Development Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDL</td>
<td>Interface Definition Language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOSS</td>
<td>Input-Output Services Segment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISO</td>
<td>International Organization for Standardization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSP</td>
<td>Language Server Protocol, Liskov Substitution Principle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSS</td>
<td>Operating System Segment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCS</td>
<td>Portable Components Segment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSSS</td>
<td>Platform-Specific Services Segment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTOS</td>
<td>Real-Time Operating Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDM</td>
<td>Shared Data Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TQL</td>
<td>Tool Qualification Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSS</td>
<td>Transport Services Segment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UoC</td>
<td>Unit of Conformance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UoP</td>
<td>Unit of Portability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USM</td>
<td>UoP-Supplied Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VA</td>
<td>Verification Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCET</td>
<td>Worst-Case Execution Time</td>
</tr>
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6 References

Please note that the links below are valid at the time of writing but cannot be guaranteed for the future.

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Benjamin M. Brosgol, Patrick Rogers and Dudrey Smith, “Portable, Reliable and Efficient Concurrency: Ravenscar Ada Tasking and the FACE™ Safety Profiles”, in Military Embedded Systems, November-December 2018


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